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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-4-103
(2010).
STATUTES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-98(2) (1993):
A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary
partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or
permanent total disability benefits is barred, unless an application for
hearing is filed with the commission within six years after the date of the
accident.
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-78 (1993):
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be
continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to
time modify or change its former findings and orders. Records pertaining
to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of
total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in
Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(3)(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the
statutes of limitations contained in other sections of this chapter of Title 35,
Chapter 2, the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law.
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation
referred to in Subsection (a) in any respect.
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-10-6 and Section 35-10-7 (1993)
Section 6: When it appears that an injured worker is or will be a disabled
injured worker, or when the period of the injured worker's temporary total
disability compensation exceeds 90 days, whichever comes first, the
employer or its workers' compensation insurance carrier shall, within 30
days thereafter file with the commission and serve on the injured worker an
initial written report assessing the injured worker's need or lack of need for
vocational assistance in reemployment. The employer or carrier shall also
provide the injured worker information regarding employment.
Section 7: When it appears that an injured worker is a disabled injured
1
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worker, the employer or its workers' compensation insurance carrier shall
within ten days of receiving the initial report, unless otherwise authorized
by the commission, refer the disabled injured worker to the Utah State
Office of Rehabilitation or, at the employer's or insurance carriers option to
a private rehabilitation or reemployment service, to provide an evaluation
and to develop a reemployment plan.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case
This case involves the application of the statute of limitations to a claim for
permanent total disability benefits arising out of an industrial accident which occurred on
October 13, 1993, as well as the Labor Commission's continuing jurisdiction over such a
claim. In addition, there is the issue of whether the equitable doctrines of laches and
waiver can properly be applied to this case.
Cecil W. Henningson injured his lower back while working as a roof bolter in a
coal mine for Sunnyside Coal Company ("Sunnyside") in Carbon County, Utah. Prior to
this injury, Mr. Henningson sustained low back injuries in several other significant
industrial accidents during his employment with Kaiser Steel, the predecessor of
Sunnyside. Sunnyside and its workers compensation insurance carrier, the Workers
Compensation Fund (WCF), accepted liability and paid Mr. Henningson temporary total
disability benefits through December 1994 and permanent partial disability cbenefits
through June 1995.
II. Course of Proceedings
Mr. Henningson filed an Application for Hearing with the Labor Commission on
March 14, 2007 requesting permanent total disability compensation for the low back
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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injury he sustained on October 13, 1993. (R. at 1-12.) On May 10, 2007 he filed an
Amended Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor Commission ("Commission"),
clarifying that the date of the accident was October 13, 1993. (R. at 25.)
Sunnyside and WCF, and Employers' Reinsurance Fund (ERF) separately, filed
Answers to Mr. Henningson's Application for Hearing in which they denied that he was
entitled to permanent total disability benefits. (R. at 15-19, 20-23.) On July 3, 2007,
Sunnyside and WCF filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and an accompanying
memorandum in which they argued that Mr. Henningson5 s claim was barred by section
35-1-98(2) (1993) of the Utah Code. (R. at 39-83). ERF joined in that motion. (R. at 13637). On August 15, 2007, the Administrative Law Judge Debbie L. Hann issued an Order
denying Sunny side's motion. (R. at 131-35.)
A hearing was held on Mr. Henningson's application on August 20, 2007. (R. at
338.) Several months later, the Administrative Law Judge issued her Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order in which she awarded Mr. Henningson permanent total
disability benefits for the low back injury he sustained on October 13, 1993. (R. at 16673.) Sunnyside and WCF, and ERF separately, filed motions for review challenging the
Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits. (R. at 174-206, 207-313.)
III.

Disposition by the Labor Commission
On December 27, 2010, the Labor Commission issued its Order on Motion for

Review affirming the award of permanent total disability compensation to Mr.
Henningson. (R. at 330-36.) The Labor Commission cited to Vigos v. Mountainland
Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, 993 P.2d 207, and held that Mr. Henningson's claim satisfied
3
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the limitations period in Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-98(2) (1993) because, like
the employer and insurance carrier in Vigos, Sunnyside and WCF paid substantial
disability benefits and medical expenses within six years of the accident. (R. at 332.)
Furthermore, the Labor Commission noted that required reports regarding Mr.
Henningson's claims were filed in a timely manner, just like in Vigos. (R. at 332.) The
Labor Commission also concluded that it had continuing jurisdiction to modify Mr.
Henningson's prior award under Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-78 (1993) because it
was inadequate. (R. at 333.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Mr. Henningson sustained a low back injury on December 4, 1981 while working
at Kaiser Steel, the predecessor of Sunnyside Coal Company. This lifting injury required
Mr. Henningson to undergo surgery to repair a level L4-5 herniated disc. (R. at 337, pp.
79-84.) As a result of this industrial injury, Dr. Richard Jackson gave Mr. Henningson a
5% whole person impairment rating. (R. at 337, p. 80.) The workers compensation
insurer paid all benefits, including medical, temporary total disability, and permanent
partial disability. (R. at 208.) Forms were filed with the Labor Commission and the
employer. (R. at 337, p. 100-04.)
2. Mr. Henningson suffered another injury on July 18, 1987 while working at Kaiser
Steel. He fell 6 feet from scaffolding and again injured his lower back. He underwent
another surgery to repair another herniated disc, this time at level L5-S1. (R. at 337, p.
90.) The workers compensation insurer again paid all appropriate benefits, including a
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15% whole person impairment. (R. at 167.) Again, numerous forms were filed with the
WCF and the Utah Labor Commission. (R. at 337, pp. 92-98.)
3. Mr. Henningson suffered other industrial injuries to his lower back while working
for Kaiser Steel—specifically, on October 1, 1979 (R. at 337, pp. 106, 185-187),
November 12, 1979 (R. at 337, p. 107), and September 6, 1993 (R. at 337, pp. 48-62).
4. Mr. Henningson again injured his lower back while in the course and scope of his
employment with Sunnyside Coal Company on October 13, 1993. (R. at 208.) He was
lifting a 100 plus pound stopper, a piece of machinery used by a roof bolter in the mine.
(R. at 25; 338, p. 5:6-17.)
5. As a result of this injury, Mr. Henningson underwent a two level surgical fusion
using internal fixation (i.e. rods and screws from the lumbar at level 4 to the sacrum). (R.
at 337, p. 110).
6. The workers compensation insurer again paid all benefits, including medicals
benefits, temporary total disability benefits, and permanent partial disability benefits of a
22% whole person impairment rating given by Dr. Momberger. (R. at 208; 337, pp. 5155.) Again, numerous forms were filed with the Utah Labor Commission, Industrial
Accident Division and the WCF. (R. at 337, pp. 6, 15, 30, 33-42, 109-15.)
7. Dr. Momberger requested vocational assistance for the Petitioner from the
Workers Compensation Fund. (R. at 337, pp. 51-55.) However, the Workers
Compensation Fund never granted vocational assistance to Mr. Henningson. (R. at 338,
p. 28:3-5.)

5
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8. Mr. Henningson started working at Kaiser/Sunnyside Coal in 1972 and was
terminated in 1993 due to his industrial accident. (R. at 338, p. 23).
9. Mr. Henningson, finished the ninth (9th) grade in school. (R. at 338, p. 22:10-16.)
He has difficulty reading, has never read an entire book, and is a poor speller. (R. at 162;
338, p. 22-23.). According to Mr. Henningson's own vocational expert, Dina Galli, Mr.
Henningson lacks transferrable skills and the capacity to retrain for a new vocation. (R. at
165.)
10. In December 1993, Dr. Alan L. Colledge stated, "I believe his degenerative
cascade from his prior two discectomies [industrial accidents of December 4, 1981 and
July 18, 1987] have certainly predisposed him for what he has now. I believe that had he
not had those, he would not have been in the condition he is at now." (R. at 337, p. 34.)
11. In January 1994, Mr. Henningson's treating physician, Dr. Momberger, indicated
that, on a scale from 1 to 10, Mr. Henningson's pain level averaged 4.5 and at its worst
was a 10. (R. at 337, p. 112.) In December 1994, Dr. Momberger determined that Mr.
Henningson fit into the category of "light to light medium work," indicated that his
condition was "permanent," and stated that, once his other skills were considered, "the
decision of his employability can then be decided." (R. 338, p. 52.)
12. In May 1994, Mr. Henningson applied for Social Security disability benefits. (R.
at 4.) On April 28, 1995, the Social Security Administration determined that Mr.
Henningson had been under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act and
Regulations since October 14, 1993. (R. at 7.) The Social Security Administration also
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recommended that "the implementing component conduct continuing disability reviews
at the soonest possible opportunity as the claimant's return to work is near." (R. at 8.)
13. In February 1997, Dr. Colledge noted in a disability insurance form that Mr.
Henningson was permanently disabled and unable to work since 1993, but also noted that
Mr. Henningson's prognosis was "good." (R. at 9).
14. In 1997, Dr. David R. Heiner noted that Mr. Henningson reported his back pain
as a 3 on a scale from 1 to 5, and that his pain is "throbbing and present pretty much all of
the time." (R. at 337, p. 88A.). Dr. Heiner also noted that the pain had "been present over
the years and is worsening with time." (R. at 337, p. 88A.)
15. In August 2007, prior to the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, Dr.
Heiner indicated on a Physician's Assessment Form that in a typical 8-hour work day,
Mr. Henningson would be able to stand for 20 minutes total and 15 minutes at any one
time. (R. at 337, p. 88C.) Dr. Heiner also indicated that Mr. Henningson could lift only 5
pounds frequently, 10 pounds occasionally, and 20 pounds rarely. (R. at 337, p. 88C.)
Dr. Heiner specifically wrote that Mr. Henningson should not "stoop, bend, lift, crawl,
climb, walk longer than lhr, stand > 15 minutes." (R. at 337, p. 88C.)
16. In August 2007, at the hearing with the Administrative Law Judge, Mr.
Henningson reported that he had more pain in his back and legs. (R. at 338, p. 32:8-14.)
Mr. Henningson also reported that his pain level was a 7 or 8 on a scale of 0 to 10. (R. at
338, p. 34:11-20.) Furthermore, Mr. Henningson reported difficulty with sleeping,
getting nauseated, feeling hopeless, and even considering taking his own life. (R. at 338,
p. 33:2-24.)
7
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Labor Commission correctly concluded that Mr. Henningson5 s claim for
permanent total disability compensation is not barred by the statute of limitations in Utah
Code Annotated section 35-1-98(2) (1993). In Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc.,
2000 UT 2, 993 P.2d 207, the Utah Supreme court held that a claim for permanent total
disability benefits is not barred where all relevant parties and the Commission are given
notice of (1) the material facts on which the claim asserted is to depend and (2) whom the
claim is asserted against, within the six-year limitations period. Other cases predating
Vigos have similarly held. Here, Mr. Henningson's claim for permanent total disability
is not barred because all necessary forms were filed and significant benefits paid to Mr.
Henningson within the six-year limitations period.
The Labor Commission correctly concluded that its exercise of continuing
jurisdiction over Mr. Henningson's claim for permanent total disability was proper. Utah
Code Annotated section 35-1-78 (1993) provides that the jurisdiction of the Commission
over each case shall be continuing. Utah case law has interpreted section 35-1-78 to
mean that, once the limitations period in section 35-1-98(2) is satisfied, the Commission
obtains continuing jurisdiction over the claim and may modify an award of disability
benefits where it is shown that there is a significant change or new development in the
injury or that the previous award was inadequate. Here, the Labor Commission had
continuing jurisdiction to modify Mr. Henningson9 s previous award of temporary total
and permanent partial disability benefits because the limitations period in section 35-198(2) was satisfied. Moreover, the Labor Commission's grant of permanent total
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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disability benefits to Mr. Henningson was proper because there was proof that the
previous award was inadequate.
The equitable doctrines of laches and waiver do not preclude Mr. Henningson's
claim as ERF contends. First, the equitable doctrines of laches and waiver are not
applicable to claims before the Labor Commission. However, even if this Court finds
that laches and waiver are applicable, the required elements of such defenses are not
present in this case. To succeed in a laches defense, a defendant must establish that (1)
the claimant unreasonably delayed in bringing his claim and that (2) the defendant was
prejudiced by such a delay. Here, Mr. Henningson did not unreasonably delay in
bringing his claim because he met the six-year limitations requirement in section 35-198(2). Additionally, even if there was an unreasonable delay, ERF was not prejudiced
because (1) as a reinsurer it was not entitled to initial notice of Mr. Henningson's injuries,
and (2) there is no problem with stale evidence since there is ample evidence that ERF
may examine and from which it may raise defenses.
Furthermore, policy considerations favor Mr. Henningson's award of permanent
total disability. The workers compensation scheme was established to provide remedies
to workers injured in the course of their employment, irrespective of fault, in lieu of
common law tort actions. The goal was to place the burden of compensating for
workplace injuries on businesses and their insurance carriers. Accordingly, Utah courts
have held that the Workers Compensation Act should be liberally construed and applied
in favor of finding employee coverage. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, this Court
should affirm the Labor Commission's award of permanent total disability benefits to Mr.
9
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Henningson.
ARGUMENT
I. THE LABOR COMMISSION CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT MR.
HENNINGSON'S CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
COMPENSATION IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-1-98(2)
Appellants Employers5 Reinsurance Fund (ERF), Workers Compensation Fund
(WCF), and Sunnyside Coal Company ("Sunnyside") (collectively, the "Appellants")
have argued that Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-98(2) (1993)1 bars Mr. Henningson's
claim for permanent total disability compensation. Section 35-1-98(2) (1993) provides:
(2) A claim for compensation for . . . permanent total disability benefits is
barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the commission
within six years after the date of the accident.
Specifically, Appellants assert that, under this provision, Mr. Henningson's March 14,
2007 claim for permanent total disability benefits is barred because he did not file a
formal "application for hearing" within six years of his accident. Appellants misinterpret
the meaning and application of the limitations period in section 35-1-98(2).
In Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, 993 P.2d, the Utah Supreme
Court specifically addressed the meaning and application of the limitations period in
section 35-1-98(2). In that case, a construction worker, Vigos, fell and injured his head
and back while working for his employer in October 1988. Id. If 2. Shortly after his
accident, an "Employer's Report of Injury" and a "Physician's Initial Report of Work
1

Because Mr. Henningson was injured in 1993, the applicable workers' compensation statutory scheme for his
claims is Utah Code Ann. title 35, chapter 1, as amended in 1993.
2
In Vigos, the Utah Supreme Court examined section 35-1-99(3) (1988), the substantial equivalent of 35-1-98(2)
(1993). The Legislature relocated and renamed section 35-1-99(3) as: section 35-1-98(2) in 1990, section 35A-3417(2) in 1996, and section 34A-2-417(2) in 1997. See Vigos at If 1, n.l.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Injury or Occupational Disease" were filed with both the WCF and the Commission. IdL ^
2, 12. The WCF voluntarily granted Vigos temporary total disability benefits through
May 1989 and covered his related medical expenses through July 1989. Id. ^[3.
Between 1989 and 1994, Vigos attempted to work various jobs, but was unable to
hold any of them due to injuries sustained in his 1988 accident. Id. ^f 4. In January 1994,
Vigos filed for social security disability benefits, which were denied twice before being
awarded in June 1995. Id. In July 1995, six years and nine months after his accident,
"Vigos filed an 'Application for Hearing—Form 00 V with the Commission requesting
medical expenses, temporary and permanent total disability benefits, and travel
expenses." Id. f 5. An administrative law judge dismissed Vigos's workers
compensation claim because it was made more than six years after his accident. IdL The
Commission and Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that section 35-1-98(2) did not bar
Vigos's claim for permanent total disability benefits where ".. . the required forms were
filed, disability benefits paid and medical expenses compensated before the six-year
period ended." Id Tf 25. The Vigos court reasoned that "there is no need for a formal
claim or application for hearing under section [35-1-98(2)] if the Commission's
jurisdiction is otherwise established." Id ^ 16. The court went on to state:
[T]his court has long recognized that a claim for compensation need not
bear any particular formality. In fact, great liberality as to form and
substance of an application for compensation is to be indulged. However
informal the claim may be, it need only give notice to the parties and to the
commission of the material facts on which the right asserted is to depend
and against whom the claim is made.

11
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Id 117 (quoting Utah State Ins. Fund v. Dutson. 646 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1982))
(emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted).
Other Utah Supreme Court cases have similarly held that there is no need to file a
formal application for hearing to meet the limitations period in section 35-1-98(2). See,
e.g., Mecham v. Indus. Common, 692 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 1984) (holding that "[s]ection
[35-1-98(2)] is designed solely to create jurisdiction in the [Labor] Commission and there
is no need for any particular formality, as long as notice is given"); Christensen v.
Spanish Fork City, 2000 UT 13, ^ 2, 8, 994 P.2d 1252 (holding that an injured worker
"filed a timely claim that would serve as the functional equivalent of an application for
hearing" where he "applied for, and received, temporary total disability benefits from [his
employer's] workers5 compensation carrier"); Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Indus. Comm'n,
209 P.2d 571, 574 (Utah 1949) (Wolfe, J., concurring) (stating that "the jurisdiction of
the commission may be invoked by such conduct of the parties which is equivalent to the
filing of a claim").
In the present case, just like the insurer and employer in Vigos, Appellants
accepted the industrial accident of Mr. Henningson, filed all the necessary forms, paid
significant benefits, and compensated Mr. Henningson for his related medical expenses
before the six-year period ended. Mr. Henningson5s case meets exactly the same
conditions as Vigos 5s case with regard to notice to the parties and to the Commission. As
such, Mr. Henningson has satisfied the requirements of section 35-1-98(2) and therefore
has unlimited time to bring further necessary adjudication before the Commission for
permanent total disability benefits.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In an effort to distinguish Vigos from the present case, Appellants have argued
that, unlike Vigos, Mr. Henningson knew that he was permanently and totally disabled
within the six-year statutory period and therefore had an obligation to file a formal claim
for permanent total disability during that period. However, there is nothing in the
language of section 35-1-98(2) (or the language of section 35-1-78 discussed below) that
indicates that an injured worker's time limit for filing a claim is based upon when he
knew or should have known he had a claim for additional compensation. Although the
Vigos court mentions that Vigos attempted to work and rehabilitate himself during the
period after he received temporary total disability compensation, these facts were not
dispositive to the court's reasoning and interpretation of the operation of section 35-1-98
and 35-1-78. Instead, the Vigos court held that the dispositive fact in determining
whether a claimant has satisfied the limitations period in 35-1-98(2) is whether the
Commission and the parties received notice of "the material facts on which the right
asserted is to depend and against whom the claim is made." Id. at ^f 17. Besides, even in
Vigos, Vigos's attempts to work and rehabilitate himself were unsuccessful, suggesting
that he was, in fact, permanently and totally disabled from the time of his injury even
though it was not initially recognized.
Cases predating Vigos also support the notion that a claimant's knowledge or
awareness of the extent of his disability during the six-year period following his accident

3

Interestingly, in their original Answer to Mr. Henningson's complaint dated April 12, 2007, Appellants alleged that
Mr. Henningson was not permanently totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident. (R. at 16.) Appellants
now wish to argue that Mr. Henningson was indeed permanently and totally disabled in an effort to distinguish the
present case from the facts in Vigos.
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is irrelevant. For example, in Mecham,4 the Utah Supreme Court held that a worker's
claim for permanent total disability benefits made twenty years after her industrial
accident was not barred by section 35-1-98(2) where the Industrial Commission5 received
notice of her injury and a physician's report within days of the accident. 692 P.2d at 785.
In that case, the worker, Mecham, was injured in an industrial accident on October 31,
1961 and received permanent partial disability benefits through December 1964. Id. at
784. More than twenty years after the accident, in December 1982, Mecham obtained
new counsel and filed a formal petition for permanent total disability and reimbursement
of medical expenses. Id, at 785. The Mecham court held that "once a claim or notice is
filed in accordance with section [35-1-98] . . . , the individual sections of the Workers'
Compensation Act dealing with several types of disability must be consulted for their
varying statutes of limitations." Id. The court then concluded that "Mecham's claim for
permanent total disability [was] governed by section 35-1-67 which contained] no
limitation." Id.
The Mecham court explained that "[sjection [35-1-98] is designed solely to create
jurisdiction in the Industrial Commission, and there is no need for any particular
formality, as long as notice is given," and that "[o]nce jurisdiction is established, the
nature of the claim dictates what statute of limitation applies." Id. at 785 (citing Dean
Evans Chrysler v.Morse, 692 P.2d 783 (Utah 1984); Utah State Insur. Fund, 646 P.2d
707). Likewise, in Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel 965 P.2d 583 (Utah Ct. App.
4

In Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel 965 P.2d 583 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that Mecham
was still controlling. IcL at 587 ("we believe that [Mecham] is still controlling in this case").
5
The Industrial Commission later became the Labor Commission.
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1998), the Utah Court of Appeals held, "[s]ection 35-1-67 provides for permanent total
disability and is silent as to any limitation period; thus, only the section 35-1-98 six-year
filing requirement applies as to any time limitation for the purposes of section 35-1-67."
Id at 587; see also Vigos, 2000 UT 2, ^ 14 (referring to the equivalent of section 35-198(2) and stating, "Prior to enactment of this provision in 1988, the Act had no statute of
limitations for permanent total disability claims"); Buxton v. Indus. Comm'n, 587 P.2d
121, 122-123 (Utah 1978) (referring to section 35-1-99, the equivalent of 35-1-98(2), and
stating, "The only limitations of actions statute which has application to permanent total
disability claims is Section 99 of the Act").
Thus, according to Mecham and applicable provisions of the Workers
Compensation Act, there is no set time limit for filing a claim for permanent total
disability benefits once the notice requirements of section 35-1-98 have been met.6
Furthermore, once section 35-1-98 is satisfied, the continuing jurisdiction of the
Commission is triggered by section 35-1-78. See Mecham, 692 P.2d at 786 (stating,
"Read in harmony, sections 35-1-67 and 35-1-78, allow Mecham to file at any time her
petition for permanent total disability provided that disability arises from the original
injury."). Neither the Mecham court nor the Vigos court indicated that a claimant's
knowledge of his level of disability within the six-year period following his accident is
relevant in determining whether the statute of limitations in section 35-1-98 is satisfied.
Nevertheless, there are valid reasons why Mr. Henningson did not attempt to file a
6

In fact, even a report produced by Deloitte Consulting LLP on behalf of Employers' Reinsurance Fund states:
"Since there is no statute of limitations on PTD [permanent total disability] claims, these claimants may qualify
for ERF reimbursement." See Employers' Reinsurance Fund's Actuarial Review of the Unpaid Claim Liability &
Projected Financial Statements as of June 30, 2009, at 13, attached hereto as Addendum C (emphasis added).
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formal claim for permanent total disability with the Commission in the immediate years
after his accident. By law, Mr. Henningson could not receive permanent and total
disability benefits before he reached maximum medical improvement and therefore had
no reason to file until stabilization occurred. See Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor
Common, 2001 UT App 370, If 25-26, 38 P. 3d 969. The facts indicate that Mr.
Henningson did not even reach maximum medical improvement—was not even
stabilized—until December 1994. (R. at 167; 337, p. 51.)
Additionally, the WCF paid Mr. Henningson temporary total disability through
December 1994 and permanent partial disability through June 1995. (R. at 208.) Mr.
Henningson had no need to file a claim for additional benefits while his workers
compensation carrier was presently paying him disability. No reasonable injured worker
would have filed for permanent total disability while the injured worker was still
receiving compensation benefits, recovering from his accident, and making
improvements—especially when the injured worker had not yet received Social Security
disability.
It is customary and almost even necessary to receive Social Security disability
before filing for workers compensation because the standards for social security disability
are more readily met than workers compensation standards—especially since there is no
opposing counsel. Moreover, due to differences between the procedural rules for social
security disability and workers compensation benefits, it is less risky to apply for
permanent total disability benefits from the SSA than the Labor Commission. With
Social Security Disability, if you are denied, you may reapply immediately. This is not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the case with workers compensation with regard to permanent and total disability.
Although Mr. Henningson received disability benefits from the Social Security
Administration (SSA) on April 28, 1995 after being denied twice (his initial application
and reconsideration were denied), Mr. Henningson should not be punished for receiving
these disability benefits. Sunny side and the WCF granted Mr. Henningson only
temporary total disability and permanent partial disability benefits, which required him to
seek financial assistance elsewhere. As the Utah Court of Appeals noted in Burgess, the
"[continuing jurisdiction [of the Commission], in the long run, should . . . serve the
[employer's and the WCF's] interests by, in effect, encouraging an injured worker to seek
a more conservative course of treatment or no treatment rather than feeling compelled to
try everything within a six-year period." 965 P.2d at 588-89. Likewise, here, the
continuing jurisdiction of the Commission served Sunnyside's and WCF's interests by
encouraging Mr. Henningson to seek a more conservative disability award initially (e.g.
temporary total, permanent partial, and social security disability benefits) rather than
feeling compelled to get everything he possible could within a six-year period.
II. THE LABOR COMMISSION CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT ITS
EXERCISE OF CONTINUING JURISDICTION OVER MR. HENNINGSON'S
CLAIM WAS PROPER.
A. The Labor Commission's continuing jurisdiction was proper
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-78 (1993) provides for the continuing
jurisdiction of the Commission:
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be
continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to
time modify or change its former findings and orders. Records pertaining
17
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to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of
total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in
Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(3)(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the
statutes of limitations contained in other sections of this chapter of Title 35,
Chapter 2, the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law.
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation
referred to in Subsection (a) in any respect.
The Utah Supreme Court has provided clear guidance as to the meaning and
application of section 35-1-78. For example, in Vigos, the Utah Supreme Court held that,
"[b]ecause Vigos satisfied the statute of limitations in section [35-1-98(2)], the powers
and jurisdiction of the commission over his case are continuing, as the language of
section 35-1-78 plainly states." 2000 UT 2, ^J 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
other words, "subsection 35-1-78(1) gives the Commission continuing jurisdiction, even
after the limitations period has run, ifjurisdiction over the claim was established before
the statute ran." Id. ^ 29. The Vigos court noted that "[t]he Commission has been held to
have jurisdiction when all the appropriate parties were aware of the material,
jurisdictional facts upon which the workers' compensation claim was based . .. and the
purpose and intent of the workers9 compensation jurisdictional statutes were fulfilled."
Id. If 24 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In Ortega v. Meadow Valley Construction, 2000 UT 24, 996 P.2d 1039, the Utah
Supreme came to the same conclusion as it did in Vigos. The Ortega court stated that
"the beneficial effect of continuing jurisdiction is to keep the worker's opportunity for
additional benefits alive where he has once complied with the six-year statute of
limitations." Ortega, 2000 UT 24, f 10. The Ortega court explained that section 35-1-78
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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logically leads to this conclusion when taken as a whole:
Our interpretation is supported by the provision in section 35-1-78 which
reads, "records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for
ten years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a
claim has been filed as in section 35-1-98 may be destroyed at the
discretion of the commission." It appears that there would have been no
reason to prevent the destruction of records pertaining to cases "of total
permanent disability" or "cases in which a claim has been filed as in section
35-1-98" unless the commission had continuing jurisdiction to reexamine
those cases beyond the ten-year period.

nin.
In the present case, Mr. Henningson has satisfied the limitations period set forth in
section 35-1-98(2) because all the appropriate parties were made aware of the material,
jurisdictional facts upon which his workers compensation claim is based. That is, once
all the necessary forms were filed, Sunny side, WCF, and the Commission became aware
of Mr. Henningson's injuries soon after his accident. Furthermore, Sunnyside and WCF
acknowledged his workers compensation claim by voluntarily paying significant benefits
to Mr. Henningson—temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits—and
compensating him for his related medical expenses, all within the six-year period.
Furthermore, despite Appellants' contention to the contrary, there is no time limit
to the Commissions continuing jurisdiction. In fact, the Vigos court pointed out that such
a policy benefits both employers and employees alike:
Section 35-1-78 imposes no time limit on the Commission's continuing
jurisdiction.
Indeed, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, the
authoritative treatise on workers' compensation, notes that Utah is in "an
important minority of states [that] permit reopening for changed condition
at any time'" That policy benefits both employers and employees.
Disability benefits may be decreased in favor of an employer or increased
to benefit an injured worker when circumstances warrant. It would be
19
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unfairly discriminatory to allow a reduction of benefits under the
continuing jurisdiction statute but not allow an increase in benefits to
employees after the specified period has run. . . . Since Vigos satisfied the
statute of limitations in section [35-1-98(2)], the Commission had
continuing jurisdiction pursuant to section 35-1-48 [sic] over his request for
additional benefits.
2000 UT 2, Tf 27 (citing Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers'
Compensation Law § 78.10 (1998)) (second emphasis added).
In Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 733 P.2d 158 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court also provided the rationale behind the absence of a time limit for a
claim for permanent and total disability. The Spencer court stated, "Inherent in the
Workmen's Compensation Act is the recognition that industrial injuries cannot
always be diagnosed with absolute accuracy, nor their consequences predicted with
complete certainty, and therefore the rule of res judicata is not ordinarily applicable
in proceedings of this kind." 733 P.2d at 161 (citing Mollerup Van Lines v. Adams,
398 P.2d 882 (Utah 1965)). Thus, as the foregoing cases so held, section 35-1-78
grants the Commission continuing jurisdiction over Mr. Henningson's claim because
Mr. Henningson satisfied the statute of limitations in section 35-1-98(2).
B. Once the Labor Commission obtains continuing jurisdiction, it may modify
an award if there is (1) evidence of some significant change or new
development in a claimant's injury or (2) proof of the previous awards
inadequacy
Section 35-1-78 "empowers the Commission to make such modification of former
findings and orders as i n its opinion may be justified.55' Buxton, 587 P.2d at 123; see
also Mecham„ 692 P.2d at 786 ("The Industrial Commission has continuing jurisdiction
under section 35-1-78 of the Act to modify awards if in its opinion it is justified.").
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Moreover, "[t]he power of the [Labor] Commission to modify awards when 'in its
opinion' modification is justified is not an arbitrary power . . . but a power wedded to the
duty to examine credible evidence." Spencer, 733 P.2d at 161. Accordingly, to modify
a claim, section 35-1-78 has been interpreted to require (1) "evidence of some significant
change or new development in the claimant's injury" or (2) "proof of the previous
award's inadequacy." Buxton, 587 P.2d at 123; see also Ortega, 2000 UT 24, ^ 10
(stating the same); Spencer, 733 P.2d at 161 ("Under well-established principles of stare
decisis, the basis of modification is provided by evidence of some significant change or
new development in the claimant's injury or proof of the previous award's inadequacy.").
In the present case, there is (1) evidence of a significant change or new
development in Mr. Henningson's injury, and (2) proof of the previous award's
inadequacy. Nevertheless, Mr. Henningson needs to meet only one of these two
requirements to empower the commission to properly modify his award.
i) The Prior Award was Inadequate
This Court should find that the prior award was inadequate. First, Appellants
themselves have vigorously argued before this Court that Mr. Henningson was
permanently and totally disabled since the time of his injury—despite granting Mr.
Henningson only temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits at that time.
Second, Labor Commissioner Hayashi herself upheld the Administrative Law Judge's
decision to grant Mr. Henningson permanent total disability benefits based on a finding
that the previous award was inadequate. (Addendum B at 4.) Commissioner Hayashi
also noted in her findings of fact that "Sunnyside and the ERF concede that Mr.
21
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Henningson is now permanently and totally disabled.'5 (Addendum B at 2.)

Finally,

despite the Social Security Administration "implementing component conduct continuing
disability reviews at the soonest possible opportunity as the claimant's return to work is
near" in April 1995 (R. at 8), the Social Security Administration has continued to pay Mr.
Henningson disability benefits. This suggests that Mr. Henningson's condition is more
permanent than originally thought and therefore supports a finding that the original award
for temporary total and permanent partial disability was inadequate.
ii) There is evidence of some significant change or new development in Mr.
Henningson }s injury
Even if this Court determines that Mr. Henningson's original award of temporary
total and permanent partial disability benefits was not inadequate, this Court should, at a
minimum, find that he is now permanently and totally disabled and therefore there has
been a significant change or new development in his injury.
Here, there is evidence of some significant change in Mr. Henningson's injury
affecting his ability to perform remunerative employment. First, Mr. Henningson's
physical condition has deteriorated since his original award. In his affidavit, Mr.
Henningson acknowledged his increased level of pain, his inability to engage in as many
activities as before, his need to lie down more often, his continued loss of strength, and
his decreased range of motion. (R. at 338, p. 34-35.) Mr. Henningson's worsened
condition is further evidenced by his decreased level of mobility and activity. It is
increasingly difficult for him to bend over and he no longer is able to do dishes or mow
his lawn. (R. at 98.) Mr. Henningson's worsening condition has also required him to
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take more pain medication (Oxycodone), and spend more time in his hot tub to relieve his
back pain. (R. at 338, p. 20:10-11.)
Second, Mr. Henningson's psychological condition has changed due to increased
depression related to his injury. Mr. Henningson experiences symptoms ranging from
trouble sleeping and irritability, to hopelessness and even thinking about taking his own
life. (R. at 99; 338, p. 33:2-24.) Mr. Henningson's depression has been aggravated by
several factors: (1) the loss of hope of ever feeling better (R. at 98; 338, p. 33:16-24), (2)
the realization of the permanence of his condition (R. at 98), and (3) the unlikelihood of a
medical breakthrough to cure his condition.
Additionally, "[i]t is .. . well-established law that benefits are awarded on the
basis of disability, not physical impairment, and that a claimant's disability may be found
to be total if he can no longer perform the duties of the character required in his
occupation prior to his injury." Spencer, 733 P.2d at 161 (citing Hardman v. Salt Lake
City Fleet Mgmt, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986); Marshall v. Indus. Comm'n, 681 P.2d 208
(Utah 1984); Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981)).
Thus, "[t]he [Labor] Commission has a duty to determine from competent evidence
whether a claimant's loss of function represents total disability in terms of capacity to
perform remunerative employment." Spencer, 733 P.2d at 161. Furthermore, that
"determination should encompass such factors as the education, mental capacity, and age
of the claimant." Id at 161.
When taking into account such factors as Mr. Henningson's education, mental
capacity, and age—as well as the premise that disability is measured by the inability to
' 23
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find remunerative employment—significant changes or new developments in Mr.
Henningson5 s condition become even more prevalent. As to education and mental
capacity, Mr. Henningson has finished only the ninth (9th) grade in school. (R. at 338, p.
22:10-16.) As stated, he has difficulty reading, has never read an entire book, and is a
poor speller. (R. at 162; 338, p. 22-23.). According to his own vocational report, Mr.
Henningson lacks transferrable skills and the capacity to retrain for a new vocation. (R. at
165.) In an increasingly competitive employment market, where education is more
important than ever, Mr. Henningson5 s lack of education and mental capacity has
drastically reduced his likelihood of finding and performing remunerative employment.
His depression further hinders his ability to find and perform remunerative employment.
As to age, in 1993 the Petitioner was 39; now he is over 52 years old. The Social
Security Administration, like the Spencer court, recognizes age as a determinative factor
in considering disability. The SSA places each applicant in one of five categories: those
ages (1) 18 to 44; (2) 45 to 49; (3) 50 to 54; (4) 55 to 59; and (5) 60 to 64. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1563. As an applicant advances in age, the SSA recognizes greater physical,
mental (psychological), and social limitations and reduces the requirements for a finding
of disability accordingly. See id.; see generally Patterson v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1455 (11th
Cir. 1986).
Therefore, in the event this Court finds that Mr. Henningson5 s original disability
award was not inadequate, it should, at a minimum, find that there was a significant
change or new development in Mr. Henningson5s injury.
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III.

THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINES OF LACHES AND WAIVER DO NOT
PRECLUDE MR. HENNINGSON'S CLAIM
A. The equitable defenses of laches and waiver are not applicable
Appellant, ERF, contends that the equitable doctrines of laches and waiver

preclude Mr. Henningson's claim. However, equitable defenses, such as laches and
waiver, are inapplicable to claims before the Labor Commission. In Bevans v. Industrial
Commission, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals held that the
Industrial Commission, the predecessor to the Labor Commission, did not have statutory
authority to reduce the amount of workers compensation benefits awarded to an
employee where an administrative law judge felt that equity demanded such a result. In
that case, the employee was injured in an automobile accident during the course of his
employment and received compensation from both his employer (under the workers
compensation laws) and the employer's no-fault auto insurer. Id. at 574. The
administrative law judge ordered that the amount of compensation required from the
employer be reduced by the amount the employee retained from the auto insurer because
"equity demanded" it. Id. at 575.
However, on review, the Utah Court of Appeals vacated the order and held that
such an equitable determination by the administrative law judge was inappropriate. The
Bevans court stated that "the Industrial Commission remains a statutorily-created agency,
not a court of equity." IdL at 576. As such, the court concluded that "the Industrial
Commission has only those powers expressly or impliedly granted to it by the
legislature." Id, The Bevans court noted that "there is no provision in the Utah workers'
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compensation statute expressly or impliedly authorizing any reduction of workers5
compensation benefits by amounts received by an employee . . . from his or her . . .
employer's no fault insurer." Id. at 577.
In the present case, the Labor Commission remains a statutorily-created agency,
not a court of equity. As such, it has only those powers expressly or impliedly granted to
it by the legislature and does not have authority to consider equitable defenses—at least
in as much as it does not have authority to grant equitable relief as the Bevans court held.
Accordingly, ERFs equitable defenses of laches and waiver are inapplicable in the
present administrative action.
Lastly, from a practical standpoint, the WCF and ERF have done no vocational
rehabilitation regarding Mr. Henningson—as mandated under Utah Code Annotated
sections 35-10-6 and 35-10-7 (1993). Neither did they tell Mr. Henningson about the
possibility of a permanent and total disability claim. Nevertheless, ERF now seeks to
argue the equitable doctrine laches to avoid paying additional benefits.
B. Even if the equitable defenses of laches and waiver are applicable, ERF has
not established the elements necessary to establish such defenses
Even if this Court finds that equitable defenses are applicable to claims before the
Labor Commission, the elements necessary to establish a valid laches or waiver defense
are not present here. In Borland ex rel. Utah Department of Social Services v. Chandler,
733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that to succeed in a laches
defense, a defendant must establish (1) "that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in
bringing the action," and (2) "that the defendant was prejudiced by that delay.55 Id at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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147. Thus, "even though the statutory period of limitations has lapsed, it may be that a
claim is not barred by laches, such as where there has been no inexcusable delay in
seeking a remedy or no prejudice to the defendant from the passage of time." 27 A Am.
Jur. 2d Equity § 164 (West 2011).
i) Unreasonable Delay
Here, Mr. Henningson did not unreasonably delay in bringing the action. As
discussed above, once the limitations period in section 35-1-98(2) has been satisfied and
the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission is invoked under section 35-1-78, there is
no time limit to bring a claim for permanent total disability. Thus, because there was no
time limit, Mr. Henningson cannot be said to have unreasonably delayed bringing his
claim for permanent total disability—nor can he be said to have waived his claim.
ii) Prejudice to ERF
ERF was not prejudiced by Mr. Henningson's filing for permanent total disability
in 2007. As a reinsurer, ERF was not entitled to nor did it have a need for notice of Mr.
Henningson's initial injury in 1993. Nevertheless, ERF did have notice.
(1) Notice is not required
ERF's maintains that it "never received notice of Mr. Henningson's permanent
partial disability claim" and therefore it was prejudiced in this case because it had "no
opportunity to adjust, defend, or timely evaluate this case." (Appellant ERF Br. at 26.)
However, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, as a reinsurer, is not entitled to notice.
ERF misconstrues its role in the workers compensation scheme. As a reinsurer,
ERF insures insurers—specifically, workers compensation carriers. It is a secondary
27
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insurer that manages an insurance pool funded by premiums assessed from all workers
compensation insurer premiums in the State of Utah. ERF makes payments only after
certain thresholds are met, and this is why it is referred to a reinsurer. See Employers'
Reinsurance Fund's Actuarial Review of the Unpaid Claim Liability & Projected
Financial Statements as of June 30, 2009 by Deloitte Consulting LLP at 1, attached
hereto as Addendum C (hereinafter "Addendum C" or "Deloitte Report") ("For many
years [ERF] acted as a reinsurer to the commercial insurance market for any claimants
that exceeded a specific period of benefits with the private insurer or to pay the liability
for pre-existing impairment of workers rendered disabled by an industrial accident.").
Furthermore, ERF involvement in workers compensation cases is limited to only
permanent and total disability cases occurring before 1994 and old surviving dependent
cases. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-702 ("There is created an Employer's Reinsurance
Fund for the purpose of making payments for industrial accidents or occupational
diseases occurring on or before June 30, 1994"); see also Addendum C at 1 ("The [ERF]
provides workers compensation benefits promptly and accurately to eligible disabled
injured workers and their survivors from industrial accidents or occupational disease
occurring on or before June 30, 1994.")
In its role as a reinsurer, ERF does not normally adjust and does not initially
defend or evaluate cases. This usually occurs many years later. ERF simply assesses a
portion of all workers compensation insurance premiums in the State of Utah and
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contributes only to a very limited number of cases.7 See Addendum C at 1 ("The ERF is
funded by a surcharge on workers compensation premiums in the State and estimated
workers compensation premiums for self-insured employers.")- As a workers
compensation reinsurer, ERF enables workers compensation carriers to hedge their risk.
For example, if an injured worker is awarded permanent and total disability and is still
receiving benefits after 312 weeks or six (6) years have been paid, the ERF will step in
and pay the continuing benefits.8 This way, workers compensation carriers are assured
that they will never have to pay more than six years worth of permanent total disability
payments because ERF assumes that risk.
Importantly, any insurer, including ERF, can investigate at any time an individual
presently on permanent and total disability (because of the Labor Commission's
continuing jurisdiction) and can file a request with the Commission to have an injured
workers permanent and total disability benefits terminated (which the ERF has done in
the past). This can occur even twenty or more years after someone is granted permanent
and total disability. Thus, because ERF can challenge permanent and total disability
status at any time, ERF does not need initial notice of a worker's injury to protect its
interests.
ERF contends that there is a problem with stale evidence in the present case

7

On January 1, 2010, for example, the amount of that assessment was 3.50% of all workers compensation
premiums; on January 1, 2009, the amount was 5.0%; and on January 1, 2008, the amount was a 7.5%. See
Addendum C at 3.
8
The Deloitte Consulting Report notes that "for claimants with less than 10% whole man pre-existing permanent
impairment, the ERF paid for compensation benefits after 312 weeks (6 years) but was not responsible for the
reimbursement of medical expenses," and that "for claimants with more than a 10% whole man pre-existing
permanent impairment, the ERF paid compensation benefits after 156 weeks (3 years) and reimbursed 50% of the
medical expenses after the first $20,000 of expenses had been paid by the insurer of employer." Addendum C at 7.
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because of the time lapse between the injury and the time the claim for permanent total
disability was filed. In Vigos, the Utah Supreme Court considered the matter of stale
evidence and concluded:
[TJhere is no problem with stale evidence in this matter. The benefits
which Vigos now seeks relates to his initial injury, which Mountainland
and the Fund investigated and documented in depth. The record includes
medical diagnosis and insurance papers outlining his initial injuries.
2000 UT 2, Tf 23. Just as in Vigos, there is no problem with stale evidence in the present
case. The benefits which Mr. Henningson currently seeks relate to his injury, which
Sunnyside and the WCF investigated and documented in depth. Furthermore, the record
is full of medical diagnosis and insurance papers outlining his initial injuries.
Accordingly, ERF has ample evidence that it may examine and from which it may raise
defenses.
ERF also argues that because it did not receive initial notice of Henningson's
injury, it did not have an opportunity to "adjust its accounts or provide for a reserve to
pay future benefits that may be awarded." (Appellant ERF's Br. at 32.) The Utah
Supreme Court has held that "[c]osts voluntarily undertaken in the face of a known risk
of litigation cannot be used later to support a claim of prejudice due to laches." Sandy
City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 227, 230 (Utah 1992). Likewise, reserves that were
not maintained in the face of a known risk of litigation cannot be used to support a claim
of prejudice due to laches.
However, the Deloitte Report cited above demonstrates conclusively that ERF has
taken steps to set aside reserves for cases just like Mr. Henningson's. Under the
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subheading "Permanent total disability benefits - Incurred but not reported (IBNR)
claims," Deloitte states the following:
Based on historical claim reporting patterns, we estimated the projected
number of PTD IBNR claims. Of these claims, we estimated that 60% of
the claims will be closed by full and final settlements, 10% of the claims
will be paid out over the life of the claimant and 30% of the claims will be
closed without payment. To estimate the liability from full and final IBNR
claims we multiplied the number of claims by an average full and final
settlement per claim. To estimate the liability from IBNR claims that were
paid out over the life of the claimant, we performed an annuity calculation
assuming an average age of 58 and an average monthly payment of $1300.
Addendum C at 13. Furthermore, a table entitled "Estimated Outstanding Liability"
contains a line item called "Incurred But Not Reported Claims" where $16,249,047 is
designated for such claims. Addendum C at 24. Thus, ERF has already taken into
account the amount of reserves it should set aside to cover claims brought years after the
initial injury occurred—despite ERF's contentions to the contrary. Nevertheless, even if
this Court finds that Mr. Henningson's claim was not foreseeable and therefore was not
accounted for by ERF, there is still no prejudice stemming from Mr. Henningson's 2007
claim. It is the nature and role of a reinsurer to insure against the relatively unforeseeable
in order to provide a backstop to the liability of primary insurers.
Finally, Utah cases as well as prior Commission decisions demonstrate that the
Commission has jurisdiction over a reinsurer, such as ERF, even where direct notice is
not given, as long as the employer knew of the accident, accepted liability, and paid
benefits. In other words, no initial notice of the injury need be given to a reinsurer to
avoid prejudice. For example, in Mecham, the Utah Supreme Court held that the Second
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Injury Fund, the predecessor to the ERF,9 was also a party liable for permanent total
disability benefits in a case similar to the present case. 692 P.2d at 786 (concluding that
"[t]he Secondary Injury Fund is to be reinstated as a party to the proceedings as required
by section 35-1-67 for purposes of payment from the special fund"). Similarly, the Labor
Commission, in Nelson v. Utah Local Governments Trust and Employers Reinsurance
Fund, LC Case # 03-0037 (2005), held that the ERF was liable for permanent total
disability benefits where the ERF made essentially the same arguments against liability as
it has in the present case. Id, at 3 (holding that, "[bjecause [the claimant] is deemed to
have filed a timely application, the Commission has continuing jurisdiction over her case
and may determine the entire compensation to which she is entitled, including her right to
permanent total disability compensation against the ERF").
In summary, it is the fact that ERF is a reinsurer that allows a finding of no
prejudice where notice of an injury was not initially received. As a reinsurer, ERF is not
normally involved with claims until it could be required to pay benefits—typically after
the workers compensation carrier has paid a total of 3 to 6 years of permanent total
disability benefits. Additionally, there are no problems with stale evidence in the present
case and it is apparent that ERF has already taken steps to set aside reserves for such
claims. Furthermore, relevant case law supports the view that notice is not required to
include ERF as a party. Accordingly, ERF has not been prejudiced by a lack of notice of
Mr. Henningson's initial injury.
9

See 34A-2-702 (stating that u[t]he Employers' Reinsurance Fund succeeds to all money previously held in the
"Special Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second Injury Fund.").
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(2) ERF Had Notice
Nevertheless, even if this Court finds that ERF was required to have notice to
avoid prejudice, this Court should find that ERF did indeed have notice. From the time
of Mr. Henningson's accident on October 13, 1993 to the present, ERF has been part of
the Industrial Accidents Division (IAD) within the Utah Labor Commission.
Furthermore, the Director of the IAD also serves concurrently as the Administrator of the
ERF. The Utah Labor Commission's FY 2007 Annual Report states, in relevant part:
The [IAD] monitors all employers in the state for compliance with the
workers' compensation insurance requirement and investigates and
penalizes those employers who fail to comply; provides assistance to
injured workers in resolving disputed claims informally; records all injuries
in the state; provides assistance to injured workers in resolving disputes
informally; records all injuries in the state; provides rules for claims
handling; and administers the payment of benefits from two trust funds (the
Uninsured Employers' Fund and the Employersy Reinsurance Fund).
Addendum D (emphasis added).
From the time of Mr. Henningson's accident to the start of the current litigation,
the Director of the IAD and the Administrator of the ERF was Ms. Joyce Sewell. See i±
As head of the ERF, Ms. Sewell was not a figurehead administrator, but was deeply
involved in the minute details of the ERF. Moreover, as head of the Industrial Accidents
Division, Ms. Sewell directed the office where all notices are filed, such as the
Employer's First Report of Injury, Physician's First Report of Injury, compensation
agreements, etc. See id.
Hence, ERF had notice of Mr. Henningson's injury because its Administrator was
also the individual directly over the Division at the Labor Commission, which receives all
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notice documents. In other words, when notice documents were filed with the Industrial
Accident Division, they were effectively filed simultaneously with the ERF, which is a
sub-entity within the IAD. Since Ms. Sewell's retirement in December 2007, each
successive Administrator of the Employer's Reinsurance Fund has simultaneously served
as the Director of the Utah Labor Commission's Division of Industrial Accidents.
Lastly, if nothing else, substantially relevant case law, such as the Utah Supreme
Court's rulings in Spencer, Mecham, and Vigos, should have put ERF on notice as to the
possibility of permanent total disability claims being asserted against it at a later date,
such as after the six-year limitations period identified in section 35-1-98(2) has run.
Thus, because ERF had actual and implied notice of Mr. Henningson's injury, ERF
cannot now assert that it was prejudiced.
IV.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVOR THE LABOR COMMISSION'S
AWARD OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS TO MR.
HENNINGSON
In Burgess the Utah Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he [Workers' Compensation]

Act is a humanitarian and economical system designed to provide relief to victims of
industrial accidents." 965 P.2d at 585. More specifically, the Burgess court stated:
The Workers' Compensation Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme that
provides remedies for injuries to workers occurring in the course of their
employment, irrespective of fault, in lieu of common law tort actions. The
Act provides temporary total disability benefits, . . . temporary partial
diability benefits, . . . permanent partial and permanent total disability
benefits, . . . and medical expenses for injured employees, . . . as well as
certain other benefits. These remedies, whether viewed individually or
together, are not analogous to an ordinary lump-sum judgment that the
common law provides for personal injury actions. Not only may benefits be
paid over a period of time rather than in a lumpsum judgment, but an
award of benefits does not generally have the res judicata effect of a
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judgment.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Stoker v. Workers' Comp. Fund & Indus. Comm'n, 889 P.2d
409, 411 (Utah 1994)). The Burgess court went on to state, "[t]o give effect to that
purpose, the Act should be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage. Any
doubt respecting the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of the injured
employee." 965 P.2d at 585; see also id. at 588 ("Continuing jurisdiction to award
claimants all the benefits to which they are entitled as a result of an industrial accident is
consistent with the common law principle of liberal construction in favor of injured
employees that is at the heart of the [Workers' Compensation] Act."); Vigos, 2000 UT 2,
f 13 ("We also wconstrue[] workers' compensation statutes liberally in favor of finding
employee coverage.'" (quoting Olsen v. Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah
1998)).
Here, the law should be construed liberally in favor of granting coverage to Mr.
Henningson, an injured employee. The additional amount per month that Mr.
Henningson will receive in permanent total disability benefits (approximately $1500) will
enable him to subsist with at least some dignity.
The Utah Courts have always been interested in how their decisions affect public
policy, especially in complicated cases. See generally Intermountain Slurry Seal v.
Stephens, 2002 UT App 114, 48 P.3d 352. Here, Appellants are seeking to transfer their
statutory responsibility for the financial care of a disabled employee to other
governmental (e.g. Medicare), social, or religious organizations—exactly what the
workers compensation laws seek to avoid. Mr. Henningson is an uneducated, physically
35
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and mentally impaired individual from a rural Utah town. Rather than actively assist Mr.
Henningson through vocational rehabilitation as the law requires, see Utah Code Ann. §§
35-10-6, 35-10-7, WCF determined not to get involved and now wishes to avoid paying
disability benefits. The workers compensation scheme was not established so that Utah's
tax payers would bear the burden of paying for the care of an individual whose injuries
were clearly the result of three specific industrial accidents at one coal mine in Central
Utah—especially when that individual was covered by workers compensation insurance
at the time.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the Labor Commission's award
of permanent total disability benefits to Mr. Henningson.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

\tp day of July, 2011.

-1 KiM^y CMT. Jeffery Cotdb V\J Q
Attorney for Petitioner
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CECIL HENNINGSON,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

%#e
V5»

Case No. 07-0253
SUNNYSIDE COAL COMPANY and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND
Respondent

Judge Debbie L. Hann
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HEARING:

Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August
20,2007 1:00 PM. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

Debbie L Hann, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Cecil Henningson, was present and represented by his
attorney Jeffery Cottle Esq.
The respondents, Sunnyside Coal Company and Workers Compensation
Fund were represented by attorney Hans Scheffier Esq.
The respondent, Employers Reinsurance Fund, was represented by
attorney Edwin C Barnes Esq.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner's March 14,2007 Application for Hearing alleges entitlement to permanent total
disability compensation and interest as the result of a September 3,1993 low bade iiyury. The
Commission initiated an adjudicative proceeding the following day with an Order for Answer.
The respondents', Sunnyside Coal and Workers Compensation Fund (hereinafter "WCF"), April
12,2007 Answer admitted the petitioner was sufifered a low back injury on October 13,1993 for
which compensation was paid but denied the remaining allegations in the Application for lack of
knowledge and affirmatively alleged the petitioner was not permanently totally disabled as the
result of this industrial accident
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Cecil Henningson vs. Sunnyside Coal Company and/or Workers Compensation Fund, Employee
Reinsurance Fund
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The respondent's, Employers Reinsurance Fund (hereinafter "ERF1), April 13,2007 Answer
denied the allegations in the Application for lack of knowledge and affirmatively alleged the
petitioner is not permanently totally disabled as the result of the alleged accident nor that the
petitioner suffered from a 10% pre-existing condition requiring apportionment of medical
expenses with the other respondents*
The petitionerfiledan Amended Application for Hearing on May 10,2007 amending the date of
injury to October 13,1993. WCF's Answer re-asserted the prior defenses and affirmatively
alleged the petitioner's claim was batted by the statute of limitations and that the petitioner
sufferedfromat least a 15% whole person impairment prior to the October 13,1993 accident
Prior to the hearing, WCF filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting the petitioner's claim
is barred by Utah Code § 35-1-98(2) because the petitioner did not file an Application for
Hearing with the Commission within 6 years after the date of the accident The petitioner
opposed the motion. The Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The petitioner was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with
the respondent Sunnyside Coal Company, on October 13,1993. This accident resulted in a low
back injury. Prior to this injury, the sufferedfromat least a 10% pre-existing condition.
The petitioner suffered several prior back injuries as the result of accidents while employed by
Sunnyside Coal. After the October 13,1993 industrial accident, the petitioner underwent a third
back surgery. The petitioner's last day worked was October 13,1993, the day of the industrial
accident The petitioner was paid by temporary total disability compensation and permanent
partial disability compensation by WCF following the October 13,1993 accident Dr.
Momberger assigned a 22% whole person impairment for the petitioner's low back condition on
December 14,1995. The last compensation payment was made by WCF on June 8,1995.
The petitioner was awarded Social Security disability compensation on April 28,1995 for a
disability onset date of October 14,1993. The basis of the award was the petitioner's tow back
condition as the result of the October 13,1993 accident A significant cause of the petitioner's
disability for which he receives Social Security is the October 13,1993 industrial accident
The petitioner is tentatively permanently totally disabled as the result of the October 13,1993
industrial accident The petitioner never returned to gainful employment following this accident
The petitioner was paid temporary total disability compensation following this injury through
December IS, 1994. The petitioner is tentatively permanently totally disabled as the result of
this industrial injury beginning December 16, 1994.
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(

The parties stipulated the petitioner's weekly compensation rate for this claim is $351.00.
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
The Commission can rely on a Social Security disability determination of disability tofindan
injured worker permanently totally disabled if a significant cause of the disability is caused by
the industrial accident R612-l-lO(B),U.A.a
Utah Code § 35-1-98(2) (effective on October 13,1993) states:
A claimforcompensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial
disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total disability
benefits is barred, unless an application for hearing isfiledwith the commission within
sue years after the date of the accident
Utah Code § 35-1-78(1) (effect on October 13,1993) states:
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The
commission, after notice and bearing, mayfromtime to time, modify or change its
formerfindingsand orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and
inactiveforten years, other than cases of permanent total disability or cases in which a
claim has beenfiledas in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of die
commission.
The Utah Supreme Court mteipreted the interplay between these two provisions of the Woricers
Compensation Act as it relates to claimsfiledwith the Commission more than 6 years after the
injury date in Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc.. 993 ?2d 207 (Utah 2000).
In that case, Vigos* claim for compensation had been accepted and paid by the carrier so he
neverfiledan application for hearing with the Commission until more than 6 years after his
injury date when he made a claim for permanent total disability compensation which had been
denied by the earner. The Court held that the statute of limitations requirements of Utah Code
35-1-98(2/ were met when u...the required forms werefiled,disability benefits paid and
medical expenses compensated before the six-year period ended*' Jd.at2l4. Once this had
been met, the Commission acquired continuing jurisdiction under Utah Code § 35-1-78, which
has no time limitation.

1

This provision was found at Utah Code § 35-1-99(3) at the time Mr. Vigos* claim arose.

**
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In this case, the respondent asserts that the petitioner's claim for permanent total disability
compensation 'Vested*1 at the time he was awarded Social Security Disability compensation
based upon his low back condition which was caused by the industrial accident, as well as
various doctors opinions stating he was disabled as well as bis inability to work and lack of
gainful employment As a result, the respondents assert that by waiting until 2007 to file his
claim for permanent total disability compensation, his claim fails under Utah Code § 35-1-98.
The Court's decision in Vieos makes clear however, that once notice of the claim is given within
6 years, the statute of limitations in § 35-1-98 is met and the Commission then retains continuing
jurisdiction to hear subsequent claims and that there is no time limit to that continuing
jurisdiction. There is nothing in the language of Utah Code § 35-1-78 or 35-1-98 that places an
additional requirement that an injured worker's time limits forfilinga claim are based upon
when he knew or should have known he had a claim for additional compensation. Although the
Court in Vieos cites facts that during the period after Mr. Vigos received temporary total
disability compensation and his claim for permanent total disability compensation, he attempted
to work and rehabilitate himself following the injury, these facts are incidental to the Court's
reasoni ng and interpretation of the operation of Utah Code § 35-1-98 and 35-1-78.
The ruling in Vieos also applies to the ERR In Nelson v. Utah Local Governments Trust and
Employers Reinsurance Fund. LC Case # 03-0037, the Commission rejected the ERF's assertion
that the six year statute of limitations is not met as to the ERF when the carrier pays
compensation.
Upon a finding of tentative permanent total disability under Utah Code § 35-1-67 (effective on
October 13,1993), the case is required to be referred to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation.
Utah Code § 35-1-67(5) (effective on October 13,1993) unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally
disabled., .and ends with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning
toregular,steady work." Utah Code § 35-l-67(5)(b)(iv) (effective on October 13,1993).
Utah Code § 35*1-69 (effective on October 13,1993) requires the ERF to pay the first
$20,000.00 of medical benefits and 50% of the medical expenses thereafter along with the initial
three years of permanent total disability compensation when an injured worker who has at least a
10% whole person impairmentfromany cause incurs an additional impairment that results in
permanent total disability.
Permanent total disability compensation is reduced by 50% of Social Security retirement benefits
received by an injured worker.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The petitioner suffered a compensable industrial injury on October 13,1993 while employed by
the respondent, Sunnyside Coal Company.
The petitioner is tentatively permanently totally disabled as the result of the October 13,1993
industrial accident.
The respondents are liable to the petitioner for permanent total disability compensation for the
period December 16,1994 through December 8,2002 (first 312 weeks) in die amount of
$ 109,512.00 less credit to WCF for payment of permanent partial disability compensation in the
amount of $6,864.00 plus interest less attorney's fees. The amount payable by WCF for this
period is $47,892.00 plus interest The amount payable by ERF for this period is $54,756.00
plus interest
The respondent, ERF, is liable to the petitioner for permanent total disability compensation for
the period December 9,2002 through November 13,2007 (25728 weeks) in the amount of
$351.00 per week for a total of $90,305.28 plus interest
The respondent, ERF, is liable to the petitioner for ongoing permanent total disability
compensation beginning November 14,2007 at the rate of $351.00 per week and continuing until
the petitioner dies or is capable of returning to regular steady work. This amount, or 36% of the
current state average weekly wage rounded to the nearest dollar, whichever is higher, shall be
reduced by 50% of any Social Security retirement benefits the petitioner may receive.
The respondent, WCF is entitled to reimbursementfromthe respondent, ERF for the first
$20,000.00 of medical benefits and 50% of the medical expenses thereafter.
The petitioner shall be referred to Utah State Office of Rehabilitation for evaluation. The ERF is
liable to (he Utah State Office of Rehabilitation for an amount not to exceed $3,000.00 for use in
the rehabilitation and training of the petitioner.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that die respondents pay the petitioner for permanent total
disability compensation for the period December 16,1994 through December 8,2002 (first 312
weeks) in die amount of $109,512.00 less credit to WCF for payment of permanent partial
disability compensation in the amount of $6,864.00 plus interest less attorney's fees awarded
below. The amount payable by WCF for this period is $47,892.00. The amount payable by ERF
for this period is $54,756.00. These amounts are accrued and due and payable plus mterest at the
rate of 8% per annum*
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent, ERF, pay the petitioner for permanent total
disability compensation for the period December 9,2002 through November 13,2007 (257.28
weeks) in the amount of $351.00 per week for a total of $90,305.28. This amount is accrued and
due and payable plus interest at the rate of 8% per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent, ERF, deductfromthe amounts payable to
the petitioner the amount of $12,250.00 as attorney's fees and pay this amount directly to Jeffrey
Cottle, Attorney at Law.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent, ERF, pay the petitioner for ongoing
permanent total disability compensation beginning November 14,2007 at the rate of $351.00 per
week and continuing until the petitioner dies or is capable of returning to regular steady work.
This amount, or 36% of the current state average weekly wage rounded to the nearest dollar,
whichever is higher, shall be reduced by 50% of any Social Security retirement benefits the
petitioner may receive.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent, WCF is entitled to reimbursementfromthe
respondent, ERF for thefirst$20,000.00 of medical benefits and 50% of the medical expenses
thereafter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner shall be referred to Utah State Office of
Rehabilitation for evaluation. The ERF shall pay to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation an
amount not to exceed $3,000.00 for use in rehabilitation and training of the petitioner.
DATED this

f&QHt"
Debbie L. Hann
Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision mayfilea Motion for Review with the Adjudication Division
of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basts for
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review and must be received by the Commission within 30 daysfromthe date this decision is
signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days
of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.
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Cecil Henningson vs. Sunnyside Coal Company and/or Employers Reinsurance Fund; Workers
Compensation Fund Case No. 07-0253
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on November 15,2007, to the persons/parties at
the following addresses:
Cecil Henningson
168 Denver
Box 249
East Carbon UT 84520
Sunnyside Coal Company
Box 99
Sunnyside UT 84539
Employers Reinsurance Fund
160E300S
POBox 146611
Salt Lake City UT 84114
Workers Compensation Fund
Dennis V Lloyd Designated Agent
392 E 6400 S
Salt Lake City UT 84107
Jeflery Cottle Esq
1149 W Center St
OremUT 84057
Hans Scheffler Esq
392E6400S
Salt Lake City UT 84107
Edwin C Barnes Esq
One Utah Center 13th Fl
201 S Main St
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Adjudication Division
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
CECIL HENNINGSON,

|

Petitioner,
|

vs.
SUNNYSIDE COAL COMPANY,
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND and
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND,

ORDER ON MOTION
FORREVD2W
Case No. 07-0253

Respondents.

Sunnyside Coal Company and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund, (referred to
jointly as "Sunnyside1*) and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF'*) ask the Utah Labor
Commission to review Administrative Law Judge Harm's decision awarding permanent total
disability compensation to Cecil Henningson under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act1
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to § 63G4-301 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and § 34A-2-801(3) of the Utah Workers
Compensation Act
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Mr. Henningson's Application For Hearing,filedwith the Commission on March 14,2007,
claims permanent total disability compensation for back injuries from a work accident at Sunnyside
Coal Company on October 13,1993. Judge Hann held an evidentiary hearing and then awarded the
requested compensation. Judge Hann also apportioned liability for Mr. Henningson's disability
compensation and medical expenses between Sunnyside and the ERF.
In requesting review of Judge Harm's decision, Sunnyside and the ERF argue that Mr.
Henningson's claim for permanent total disability compensation is barred by § 98 (2) of the Act.
They also argue that, even if the claim is not barred by § 98 (2), Mr. Henningson has not shown
circumstances that would allow the Commission to grant benefits as an exercise of the Commission's
continuing jurisdiction under § 78 of the Act. Finally, in the event that Mr. Henningson's claim is
allowed, the ERF contests its liability to reimburse Sunnyside for Mr. Henningson's initial medical
expenses, while Sunnyside argues it is only liable for the first 156 weeks of Mr. Henningson's
permanent total disability compensation.
1

On October 13, 1993, the date of Mr. Henningson's accident and injury, the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act was codified as Title 35, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated. This decision refers
to the substantive provisions of the Act as they were codified on that date.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
The following facts are material to the issues raised by Sunnyside and the ERF.
Mr. Henningson worked in the coal mining industry for many years prior to October 13,
1993, the date of the accident that gives rise to his current claim for permanent total disability
compensation. During those earlier years as a miner, Mr. Henningson was involved in several work
accidents and underwent two back surgeries, leaving him with permanent, whole-person impairments
totaling at least 10%.
On October 13,1993, while Mr. Henningson was working for Sunnyside as a roof bolter, he
attempted to lift a heavy device known as a "stopper." As a result of this exertion, Mr. Henningson
again injured his back and underwent a third back surgery. All reports required by the Commission
were filed at the time of the accident and Sunnyside accepted liability for Mr. Henningson's workers'
compensation benefits. Specifically, Sunnyside paid for Mr. Henningson's medical care, temporary
total disability compensation, and permanent partial disability compensation.
Mr. Henningson reached medical stability from the October 1993 accident and subsequent
surgery on December 15, 1994. As a result of the accident, his permanent, whole-person
impairments increased to a total of 22%. In April 1995, the Social Security Administration awarded
social security disability benefits to Mr. Henningson, based on the Administration's findings that he:
1) had a severe injury; 2) could not perform the work he had done in the past; and 3) could not
perform other types of work,
Mr. Henningson never returned to work or looked for work after the October 1993 accident
Sunnyside and the ERF concede that Mr. Henningson is now permanently and totally disabled. Mr.
Henningson did not file an application with the Commission to claim permanent total disability
compensation until March 14,2007.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
The parties agree Mr. Henningson's injury from the October 1993 accident at Sunnyside is
generally compensable under the Utah Workers* Compensation Act. They also concede that Mr.
Henningson is now permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury. What is in dispute is
whether Mr. Henningson's delay in bringing his claim for permanent total disability compensation
precludes himfromreceiving those benefits. Additionally, in the event Mr. Henningson is entitled to
benefits, Sunnyside and the ERF dispute Judge Hann's allocation of liability for those benefits.
These issues are addressed below.
Section 98 (2) as a bar to M r Henningson's claim. Mr. Henningson did not file an
application for permanent total disability compensation until more than 13 years after the accident.
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Section 98 (2) provides that "[a] claim for compensation for... permanent total disability benefits is
wholly barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the [Labor Commission] within six
years after the date of the accident."
The proper interpretation of § 98 (2)'s six-year filing requirement was considered by the
Utah Supreme Court in Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, et al, 993 P.2d 207 (Utah 2000). In that
case, Mr. Vigos was injured at work during October 1988. The injury was properly reported and the
employer's insurance carrier voluntarily paid medical benefits, temporary total disability
compensation and permanent partial disability compensation. For several years, Mr. Vigos
attempted unsuccessfully to return to work. Finally, after receiving a social security determination
that he was totally disabled, Mr. Vigos filed an application for permanent total disability
compensation with the Commission on July 11,1995, more than six years after the accident
The Commission denied Mr. Vigos's claim for failure to satisfy § 98 (2)'s six-year filing
requirement After the case came before the Utah Supreme Court, the Court issued three separate
opinions:
•
The plurality decision, written by Justice Stewart and joined by Justice Durham, held
that § 98 (2)'s six-year filing requirement was satisfied if "required forms were filed,
disability benefits paid, and medical expenses compensated before the six-year period
ended" Vigos at 213. Because those steps had been taken in Mr. Vigos's case, Justice
Steward and Justice Durham held that Mr. Vigos had met the filing requirement.
•
Justice Russon issued a separate opinion concurring in the result reached by Justices
Stewart and Durham, but for a different reason. Justice Russon concluded that Mountainland
and its insurance carrier "are estoppedfrominvoking [§ 98 (2)*s six-yearfilingrequirement]
because they have already granted disability benefits to Vigos without demanding
compliance with the application requirement" Vigos at 216.
•
The third decision, a dissent written by Chief Justice Howe and joined by Justice
Zimmerman, would have strictly applied the six-year filing requirement as a bar to Mr.
Vigos's claim.
The logic of either the plurality or concurring Vigos decisions compels the conclusion in this
case that Mr. Henningson's claim for permanent total disability compensation is not barred by § 98
(2). Justice Stewart and Justice Durham's rationale is satisfied because required reports regarding
Mr. Henningson's claim were timely filed, and medical, temporary total, and permanent partial
benefits were paid before the six-year filing period ended. Justice Russon's rationale is satisfied
because Sunnyside's voluntary payment of benefits to Mr. Henningson estops Sunnysidefromnow
demanding compliance with § 98 (2). The Commission therefore concludes that Mr. Henningson's
claim is not barred by § 98 (2) and the Commission has "original jurisdiction" jurisdiction over the
claim. See Vigos at 215.
Continuing jurisdiction to award benefits. As discussed above, the Commission has
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original jurisdiction over Mr. Henningson's workers' compensation claim. However, Sunnyside and
the ERF argue that the Commission's jurisdiction does not extend so far as to allow an award of
permanent total disability compensation to Mr. Henningson for an injury that has existed with no
significant change since December 1994, the date he reached medical stability from his injury.

a
Section 78 (1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that: "[t]he powers and
jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing/' In Spencer v. Industrial
Commission, 733 P.2d 158 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court observed that u[t]he power of the
[Labor] Commission to modify awards when cin its opinion' modification is justified is not an
arbitrary power,... but a power wedded to the duty to examine credible evidence. Under wellestablished principles of stare decisis, the basis of modification is provided by evidence of some
significant change or new development in the claimant's injury or proof of the previous award's
inadequacy," (Internal citations omitted; emphasis added.)
Sunnyside and the ERF argue that Mr. Henningson has not shown any change of
circumstances to justify reopening his claim to award permanent total disability compensation. That
argument overlooks the Commission's continuing jurisdiction to award benefits upon ilproof of the
previous award's inadequacy." Spencer, ibid. In this case, Mr. Henningson has been permanently
and totally disabled since December 16, 1994. Although he received some compensation for
temporary total and permanent partial disability, he never received the permanent total disability
compensation to which he was entitled. Under the statutory provisions of the Act in effect at the
time of Mr. Henningson's accident, the scope of the Commission's continuing jurisdiction is
sufficient to reach and correct this inadequacy.
The Commission notes that the 1999 Utah Legislature amended the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act to place a 12-year time limit on the Commission's continuing jurisdiction- See
Ortega v. Meadow Valley Construction, 996 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Utah 2000). Such a legislative
modification of the Commission's continuing jurisdiction would not seem to be necessary if
Sunnyside and the ERF's arguments regarding the extent of such jurisdiction were correct. The
Legislature's action in 1999 addresses many of the policy issues identified by Sunnyside and the
ERF. However, neither Sunnyside nor the ERF argue that the 1999 amendment, enacted several
years after Mr. Henningson's accident, can be applied to his claim.
Sunnyside and ERF liability for benefits. Section 69 of the Act establishes the conditions
under which die ERF must share an employer/insurance carrier's liability for payment of benefits in
cases of permanent total disability. The statute provides that, if a permanently and totally disabled
worker had at least a 10% whole-person impairment prior to his or her work accident, then the
employer/insurer is liable for the first $20,000 in medical expenses. After the employer/insurance
carrier has paid that amount, additional medical expenses are divided equally between the ERF and
the employer/insurer. Judge Hann's order mistakenly reverses this statutory formula by requiring the
ERF to pay the initial $20,000 of Mr. Henningson's medical expenses. The Commission will modify
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Judge Harm's order to correct that error.
Section 69 also provides that, in cases involving a preexisting 10% impairment, the
employer/insurer is liable for the injured worker's first three years of permanent total disability
compensation. Thereafter, the ERF is liable to pay continuing benefits. Because Mr. Henningson
had at least a 10% impairment prior to his October 1993 accident, Sunnyside is only liable for the
first three years Mr. Henningson's permanent total disability compensation. The Commission will
modify Judge Hann's order accordingly.
Finally, in light of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Merrill v. Labor Commission et al,
227 P.3d 1099 (Utah 2009), the Commission will strike that part of Judge Hann's order that
authorizes the ERF to offset Mr. Henningson's future social security retirement benefits against his
on-going permanent total disability compensation.
ORDER
The Commission hereby modifies the terms of Judge Hann's order, found at pages five and
six of her decision, as follows:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Sunnyside Coal Company and Workers Compensation Fund
pay permanent total disability compensation to Cecil Henningson at the rate of $351 per week,
commencing on December 16,1994, and continuing for 156 weeks thereafter, until December 9,
1997. Sunnyside Coal Company and Workers Compensation Fund are entitled to a credit against
this liability for their prior payments of permanent partial disability compensation totaling $6,8645.
Sunnyside Coal Company and Workers Compensation Fund shall also pay interest to Cecil
Henningson at 8% per annum on any unpaid disability compensation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay permanent total
disability compensation to Cecil Henningson at the rate of $351 per week or 36% of the current state
average weekly wage rounded to the nearest dollar, whichever is higher. The Employers'
Reinsurance Fund shall commence these payments as of December 9,1997, and continue them until
Mr. Henningson dies or until further order of the Commission. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund
shall also pay interest to Cecil Henningson at 8% per annum on any accrued but unpaid disability
compensation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund deduct $12,250 from the
amount otherwise payable to Cecil Henningson and pay this amount directly to Jeffrey Cottle as his
fee for serving as Mr. Henningson's attorney in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse Sunnyside
and Workers Compensation Fund for 50% of their payments of Mr. Henningson's medical expenses
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that are in excess of a total of $20,000.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Henningson shall be referred to Utah State Office of
Rehabilitation for evaluation. The Employers1 Reinsurance Fund shall pay to the Utah State Office
of Rehabilitation anamount not to exceed $3,000,00 for use in Mr. Hennihgson's rehabilitation iand
training.

6

It is so ordered.
Dated this rfj day of December, 2010.

6

Sherrie Hayashi
Utah Labor Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals byfilinga petition for
review with the court Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order On Motion For Review in fee matter of Cecil
Henningson, Case No. 07-0253, was mailed first class postage prepaid this^Tfday of December,
2010, to the following:
Cecil Henningson
168 Denver
Box 249
East Carbon UT 84520
Sunnyside Coal Company
Unknown
Employers Reinsurance Fund
Sara Danielson Designated Agent
PO Box 146611
Salt Lake City UT 84114
Hans Scheffler, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund
100 W To wne Ridge Pkwy
Sandy UT 84070
Jeffery Cottle, Esq.
1149 W Center St
OremUT 84057
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
One Utah Center 13th Fl
201 S Main St
Salt Lake City UT 84111

I
\jtiffl

Q&AUL

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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Labor Commission
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Actuarial Review of the Unpaid Claim Liability &
Projected Financial Statements
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Deloitte Consulting LLP
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Detoitte Consulting LLP
2CaIPtaza
350 South Grand Ave., Suite 200
LosAngetes.CA 90071
Tel: (213)6884800
www.delome.com

October 7,2009

Larry D. Bunkall
Division Director
State of Utah - Labor Commission
Industrial Accidents Division
160 East 300 South 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6610

Dear Mr. Bunkall:
We are pleased to provide this report of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") unpaid claim
liability analysis and projected financial statements as of June 30, 2009. The unpaid claim liability
estimates and future estimates of revenue and expenses in this report have been calculated using
commonly accepted actuarial principles, appropriate actuarial methods and reasonable assumptions.
We have enjoyed working with you and your staff on this analysis. If you or any other member of
your team has any questions or comments about this report, please give us a call at one of the phone
numbers listed below.
Sincerely,

5 £ fT\«

Rod Moms, FCAS, MAAA
Specialist Leader
(213)688-3374

Anita Sathe, FCAS, FSA, MAAA
Manager
(860)725-3093

Member of
Doiotto Touche Tohmotsu
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I.

Executive Summary

Scope of Report
Deloitte Consulting LLP ("Deloitte Consulting") has been engaged by the State of Utah Labor
Commission to provide a review of the unpaid claim liability and assessment rates for the Employers
Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") monitored by the Industrial Accidents Division ('the Division"). The
purpose of this review includes the following items:
•

•

•

Provide an estimate of the unpaid claim liability to assist the Labor Commission in
preparing the financial statements of the ERF as of June 30, 2009. The unpaid claim
liability is estimated and provided on an undiscounted and discounted basis to reflect the
time value of money.
Based on the results of the unpaid claim liability analysis and projections of future
revenue and expenses, provide recommendations regarding adjustments to the percentage
surcharge on premiums ("assessment rates") to be assessed by the Commission to each
provider of workers compensation insurance in the State of Utah.
Based on the above recommendations, provide projected future financial results,
including revenue and expense projections, throughfiscalyear 2025.

The intended measure of the unpaid claim liability estimates in this report is an actuarial central
estimate, which represents an expected value over the range of reasonably possible outcomes. We
have not attempted to measure the uncertainty in the estimates. For the remainder of this report and
the exhibits, the term "unpaid loss" or "unpaid claim liability" is sometimes referred to as "reserves".
In this report, these terms are used interchangeably.
Background
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF' or "Fund") provides workers compensation benefits
promptly and accurately to eligible disabled injured workers and their survivors from industrial
accidents or occupational disease occurring on or before June 30, 1994. In addition, the Fund makes
payments of reasonable costs and fees to administer the ERF. The Fund also provided workers
compensation benefits to any injured workers who were not covered by workers compensation
insurance. For many years the Fund acted as a reinsurer to the commercial insurance market for any
claimants that exceeded a specific period of benefits with the private insurer or to pay the liability for
pre-existing impairment of workers rendered disabled by an industrial accident.
The ERF is currently in run-off mode. Beginning July 1,1994, the ERF no longer acts as the reinsurer
to the commercial insurance market. Private insurers now pay for the workers compensation benefits
of all claimants regardless of duration of the claim or pre-existing impairment of the disabled worker.
The ERF is funded by a surcharge on workers compensation premiums in the State and estimated
workers compensation premiums for self-insured employers.

1
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Proposed Future Assessment Rates
The ERF "Fund Balance'* at any given time is the amount of the assets in the fund less the liabilities of
the fund. Based on estimates of the unpaid claim liability, the ERF Fund Balance is deficient by $50.8
million as of June 30, 2009. In other words, the current assets are $50.8 million less than the current
liabilities. As mentioned previously, the current deficit does not include a provision for any potential
retroactive payments that may be required for payments already made and offset by social security
benefits.
As part of our analysis, we have estimated future ERF expenses and revenue through fiscal year 2025.
The purpose of this analysis is to review the viability of several alternative future assessment rates with
the goal of the ERF becoming fully funded (i.e. assets > liabilities) and remaining so through fiscal
year 2025. These results were presented to the Workers Compensation Advisory Council to help the
Labor Commission adopt a 2010 premium assessmentratefor the ERF. Below is a summary of results
of the projection analysis under several alternative future assessment rates.

Employers' Reinsurance Fund @06/30/09
J

fl

Calendar Year

(Scenario 1)
Current
Statutory
Maximums

1
1

Actual 2008
Actual 2009

725%
5.00%

725%
5.00%

725%
5.00%

725%
5.00%

1
1
1
1
9
1

Proposed 2010
Proposed 2011
Proposed 2012
Proposed 2013
Proposed 2014
Proposed 2015

4.50%
3.00%
1.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

325%
325%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

3.50%
100%
1.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

330%
100%
1.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

I

Year ERF Fully Funded
Balance as of Fiscal Year 2025

2012
S24.6 Million

2012
$4.4 Million

2013
$4.6 Million

2013
$4.6 Million

(Scenario 2)
Constant
Assessment
Rate

(Scenario 3)
Declining
Assessment
Rate

Proposed

Deloitte

ERF
1

Bao^naai^HHMNMHBai

Under the current statutory maximum assessment rates, the ERF would become fully funded in fiscal
year 2012, but the Fund Balance in fiscal year 2025 would be approximately $24.6 million which is
well in excess of the required balance. The analysis above would indicate that there are two alternative
options to appropriately fund the ERF at a funded balance close to break even. A constant assessment
rate at 3.25% would fully fund the ERF in fiscal year 2012 and the fund would remain fully funded
through fiscal year 2025 with a reasonable provision for any future unknown contingencies. A
declining assessment rate starting with 3.5% in fiscal year 2010 and declining thereafter could
basically accomplish the same result as the constant assessment rate except that the ERF would
become fully funded in fiscal year 2013.
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Projected Future Financial Results
At the October 7, 2009 meeting of the Advisory Council and Open Meeting, the Utah Labor
Commission decided to adopt a calendar year 2010 premium assessment rate for the ERF of 3.5%.
Therefore, we have used the declining assessment rate assumption shown previously in estimating our
revenue for the future financial results.
In order to project futurefinancialresults, estimates of future revenue and expenses is required. Future
revenue sources include premium revenues from tax assessments and investment income on cash
balances within the fund. The cash balance of the fund represents the majority of the assets of the
fund. Future expenses include claim payments, medical reimbursements to insurers, and other
administrative expenses. We note that beginning in fiscal year 2010, the other administrative expense
includes ERF staff salaries directly related to the administration of the ERF.
Below is a summary of the historical revenue and expenses from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year
2009 and projected revenue and expenses through fiscal year 2016. The amounts shown are in
millions.
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As can be seen, revenue has been significantly higher than the expenses in recent years in order to
lower the fund deficiency. Expenses will exceed the revenue once the ERF is fully funded and
assessment rates terminate.
As mentioned previously, the current fund balance as of June 30, 2009 is a deficit of $50.8 million.
The asset balances as of June 30, 2009 is approximately $190.8 million of which approximately 95%
represents cash invested with the treasurer's office. The remaining assets represent a premium tax
receivable. The liability balance as of June 30, 2009 is approximately $241.6 million which is
essentially our estimate of the unpaid claim liability as of June 30, 2009. The fund's estimated future
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Background

History
In 1917, the Utah Legislature passed the Workers Compensation Act, which required all employers in
Utah to obtain workers compensation insurance coverage. In 1919, the "Special Fund" was created to
pay the liability for pre-existing impairment of workers rendered disabled by an industrial accident.
The new fund removed a disincentive to hiring the handicapped, while at the same time broadening the
base of responsibility for pre-existing conditions. Through the years the definition of "pre-existing
impairment" and what was covered by the Special Fund was changed through Statute and in 1981 the
"Special Fund" was renamed the "Second Injury Fund."
On July 1,1988, the Second Injury Fund was renamed the Employers* Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") and
the statue was completely re-written.
Benefits Prior to July 1,1988
Prior to July 1, 1988, the ERF reimbursed carriers for a portion of the compensation benefits and all
medical expenses after 312 weeks for permanent total disability claimants. The proportionate share of
compensation benefits was based on the ratio of pre-exhibiting impairment to total impairment.
Initially, there was no minimum threshold for the amount of pre-existing impairment before the ERF
incurred any liability but the statute was eventually changed to require that a minimum threshold of
10% whole man pre-existing permanent impairment be required before the ERF incurred any liability.
Benefits on July 1,1988 and Subsequent
On July 1, 1988, the statute changed significantly to separate claimants receiving ERF coverage into
two groups. First, for claimants with less than 10% whole man pre-existing permanent impairment, the
ERF paid for compensation benefits after 312 weeks (6 years) but was not responsible for the
reimbursement of any medical expenses. Second, for claimants with more than a 10% whole man preexisting permanent impairment, the ERF paid compensation benefits after 156 weeks (3 years) and
reimbursed 50% of the medical expenses after the first $20,000 of expenses had been paid by the
insurer or employer.
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except that we used the 1983 group annuitant mortality table for mortalityratesof claimants receiving
survivor benefits.

Permanent total disability benefits - Incurred but not reported (IBNR) claims
Although the ERF has been in run-off for several years, the fund does continue to receive IBNR
claims. These IBNR claims can materialize in several ways. We have listed a few ways below in
which IBNR claims materialize.
•

Re-Opened WCF Claims: When WCF implemented its claim system in 1993,
only open claims and claims with occurrence dates in 1987 and subsequent were
included. Occasionally, a pre-1987 claim will re-open and qualify for ERF
reimbursement. Therefore, the claim may show up as a new ERF claim.

•

Recent Retirees: It is common for an attorney to contact prior claimants when
they retire to discuss if early retirement was due to a continuing problem with a
prior injury.

Since there is no statute of limitations on PTD claims, these

claimants may qualify for ERF reimbursement.
•

Occupational Disease Claims (e.g. Asbestosis claims): These claims can take
many years to manifest.

Based on historical claim reporting patterns, we estimated the projected number of PTD IBNR claims.
Of these claims, we estimated that 60% of the claims will be closed by full andfinalsettlements, 10%
of the claims will be paid out over the life of the claimant and 30% of the claims will be closed without
payment. To estimate the liabilityfromfull andfinalIBNR claims we multiplied the number of claims
by an average full andfinalsettlement per claim. To estimate the liabilityfromIBNR claims that were
paid out over the life of the claimant, we performed an annuity calculation assuming an average age of
58 and an average monthly payment of $1,300. The annuity calculation was performed using the
methodology listed in the "Permanent total disability benefits - active claims" section above. The
percentage distribution of claims, average full andfinalpayment, average age of claimant and average
monthly payment were selected based on the historical data we receivedfromthe Division.
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Deloitte

STATE OF UTAH - LABOR COMMISSION
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
AS OF JUNE 30.2009
DELOITTE PROPOSED FUTURE ASSESSMENT RATES
(SCENARIO 1)
CURRENT
STATUTORY
MAXIMUMS

ASSESSMENT

(SCENARIO 3)
CONSTANT
ASSESSMENT
RATE
(4)

(SCENARIO 4)
DECLINING
ASSESSMENT
RATE

m

(2)

(SCENARIO 2)
PRIOR ACTUARY
SCENARIO 1
PROJECTIONS
(3)

ACTUAL 2008
ACTUAL 2009

7.25%
5.00%

7.25%
5.00%

7.25%
5.00%

7.25%
5.00%

7.25%
5.00%

4.50%
3.00%
1.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

2.50%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

3.25%
3.25%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

3.50%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

3.50%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

2012
24,619,500

Never
(36,145,948)

2012
4,361,160

2013
4,552,145

CALENDAR
YEAR

PROPOSED
PROPOSED
PROPOSED
PROPOSED
PROPOSED
PROPOSED

2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

YEAR ERF FULLY FUNDED
BALANCE FISCAL YEAR 2025

(5)
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DELOITTE
ERF
PROPOSED

1

(6)

1
I

2013
4,552,145

I

I

STATE OF UTAH - LABOR COMMISSION
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
AS OF JUNE 30,2009
ESTIMATED OUTSTANDING LIABILITY

UNDISCOUNTED
(1)

PERMANENT DISABILITY (ACTIVE CLAIMS) $

(2)

SURVIVOR BENEFITS (ACTIVE CLAIMS)

(3)

320,254,101

EXHIBIT 1

DISCOUNTED"
$

205,755,335

3,492,902

2,182,078

INCURRED BUT NOT REPORTED CLAIMS

16,249,047

10,550,247

(4)

MEDICAL REIMBURSEMENTS

29.100,136

20,933,723

(5)

SETTLEMENT EXPENSES

3,214,080

2,066,099

(6)

SOCIAL SECURITY OFFSET *

(7)

TOTAL

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

DISCOUNTED LIABILITY FROM SECTION 1, EXHIBIT 4, DETAIL
DISCOUNTED LIABILITY FROM SECTION 1, EXHIBIT 5, SHEET 1
DISCOUNTED LIABILITY FROM SECTION 1, EXHIBIT 2, SHEET 1
FROM COL (12), COL (11) OF SECTION 1, EXHIBIT 3, SHEET 1
FROM COL (9), COL (8) OF SECTION 1, EXHIBIT 3, SHEET 1
TOTAL OF ROW (1) TO ROW (5)
TOTAL OF ROW (1) TO ROW (6)

372,310,266

$

241,487,483

* On April 24, 2009. the Utah Supreme Court ruled In Manill v. Verniex of Ft. Inc.. et al. that the Social Security retirement offset provision is unconstitutional.
Therefore, our estimates exclude any reduction due to future soda! security benefits. Our estimates do not indude a provision for any potential
retroactive payments the Employers' Reinsurance Fund may be required to pay in the future.
** Interest rate used for discounting future claim payments was 2.5% for the next three years increasing to 4.5% thereafter.
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Utah Labor Commission
FY 2007
Annual Report

160 East 3 0 0 South, 3 rd Floor
PO Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 1 4 - 6 6 0 0
(801) 530-6800

WWJilbQ^
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Utah
Labor Commission
FY2007 Annual Report
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The Division is responsible for the administration of the Workers' Compensation Act, which has
been a state program since 1917. The intent of the workers' compensation program is to provide
medical care and lost wages to injured workers in exchange for employer immunity from personal
injury lawsuits by their employees. The division monitors all employers in the state for compliance
with the workers' compensation insurance requirement and investigates and penalizes those
employers who fail to comply; provides assistance to injured workers in resolving disputed claims
informally; records all injuries in the state; provides rules for claims handling; and administers the
payment of benefits from two trust funds (the Uninsured Employers' Fund and the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund).
ENFORCEMENT
Workers' Compensation Act (Utah Code 34A-2 and 34A-3)
INTERNAL EFFICIENCIES
The Division is currently developing a system to electronically receive workers' compensation
claim information which will allow staff more time to work with disputed claims.
FY07 HIGHLIGHTS
Claims Section
• Recorded information on over 68,000 reported injuries.
• Processed over 225,000 documents related to industrial
injuries.
• Responded to approximately 36,000 information phone calls.
• Assisted over 1,200 non English speaking claimants with
information and claim disputes.
Policy Section
• Monitored over 77,000 employers for insurance coverage
compliance.
• Investigated over 6,000 employers for non-compliance with
workers' compensation, resulting in the issuing of over 1,500 penalties.
• Collected approximately $3 million in penalties from uninsured employers to assist in the
payment of uninsured claims through the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
• Brought over 2,500 employers into compliance with the workers' compensation system.
• Certified 80 of the state's largest employers for workers' compensation self-insurance.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

